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SALAZAR V. BU ONO : SACRED SYMBOLISM AND
THE SECULAR STATE
Ian Bartrum*
After oral argument, Salazar v. Buono looked like it might be a dud.
As Adam Liptak observed in the New York Ti mes, the Justices spent most
of their energy pressing then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan and her opponent, Peter Eliasberg of the ACLU, on the case’s tangled procedural history,
and “only Justice Antonin Scalia appeared inclined to reach the Establishment Clause question” that gave rise to the legal controversy.1 But, in the
intervening months, the case has gotten more and more interesting. First,
most members of the Court did—in at least some way—reach the substantive merits in the decision; ironically, only Justices Scalia and Clarence
Thomas would have disposed of the case on standing grounds. And second,
in a twist no one saw coming, the Latin cross at the heart of the dispute disappeared just a few days after the Court announced its decision.2 As a result, a case that seemed doomed to founder on its awkward procedural
posture has, at least fleetingly, brought the Establishment Clause back into
the national spotlight. Given the complexity of the procedural questions,
however, it is probably worthwhile to revisit the case’s history before moving on to the more intriguing substantive questions the Court’s opinions
present.
The controversy centers on an eight-foot-tall cross, made of metal tubing and painted white, perched atop a rocky outcropping called Sunrise
Rock, in the heart of the Mojave Desert National Preserve. The Veterans of
Foreign Wars first put up a wooden cross at the site—on what was then Bureau of Land Management property—in 1934, along with a plaque memorializing the “Dead of All Wars”; though the plaque has since disappeared,
and the cross has been replaced several times.3 For being “in the middle of
nowhere,” as Chief Justice John Roberts put it, the cross has been the focus
of surprising attention over the last ten years.4 The trouble started in 1999,
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Drake Law School. Thanks to the other participants in this symposium for their insightful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the editors of the Colloquy for their
hard work, and to my students for their inspiration and creativity.
1
Adam Liptak, Religion Largely Absent in Argument About Cross, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 7, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/us/08scotus.html (link).
2
Randal C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal Dispute Disappears, NYTIMES.COM, May 11,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12cross.html (link).
3
Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
4
Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472). (link).
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when the National Park Service denied a local man’s request to build a
Buddhist stupa at the site and announced its decision to take the cross down
instead.5 Apparently shocked by this development, Congress promptly denied the Park Service any appropriation to remove the cross; then designated it a national memorial to veterans of World War I; and, for good
measure, prohibited the use of federal money to “dismantle” any World
War I memorials.6
In the meantime, Frank Buono, a former Park Service administrator,
brought suit in federal district court, alleging that the presence of the cross
on government property “not open to groups or individuals [wishing] to
erect other freestanding, permanent displays” violated the Establishment
Clause.7 The court agreed, concluding that “the presence of the cross on
federal land conveys a message of endorsement of religion,” and permanently enjoined the government from allowing its display.8 While the government’s appeal was pending, the Park Service hid the cross under a
plywood box,9 and Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to convey
the disputed acre of land (now a National Memorial) to the VFW in exchange for a similar parcel elsewhere in the Mojave Preserve—with the
proviso that the property would revert to the government if it was no longer
“maintained as a war memorial.”10 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s Establishment Clause analysis, though it expressly reserved
judgment on whether the proposed land exchange might solve the constitutional problem.11
The government chose not to appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision and
that judgment—including its confirmation of Buono’s standing to sue—
became final. Buono, however, took preemptive action by asking the District Court to enforce or modify the existing injunction to prevent the Secretary of the Interior from following through with the land swap.12 The
District Court agreed with Buono’s contention that the Secretary’s exchange scheme was essentially a sham: “In light of [its unusual] history . . . the proposed transfer of the subject property can only be viewed as
5

Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205–06.
See id. at 1206–07; Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 133, 114 Stat.
2763A-230 (2001) (link); Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recover from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117
§ 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278 (2002) (link); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-248 § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 (2003) (link).
7
Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472), 2009 WL
1526915 [hereinafter Pet. Brief]; see Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
8
See Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
9
Pet. Brief at 5.
10
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87 § 8121, 117 Stat. 1100
(2004) (link).
11
Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2004) (link).
12
Pet. Brief, supra note 7, at 7. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1176–77 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(link).
6

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/20/
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an attempt to keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause violation.”13 Accordingly, the
court permanently enjoined the exchange as “an unlawful attempt to evade”
its earlier injunction,14 which the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed.15 It
was at this point that the Supreme Court finally got involved.16
The upshot of this tortured procedural odyssey—particularly the government’s decision not to appeal the original injunction—is that the case
presented the Court with two fairly narrow questions: (1) whether the District Court’s 2005 order enjoining the land exchange was, in essence, a new
proceeding, such that the government might renew its challenge to Buono’s
standing; and (2) whether the District Court had mistakenly concluded that
the land swap would not remedy the Establishment Clause violation. Only
Justices Scalia and Thomas answered the first question affirmatively,17
while two others—Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice Roberts—joined
in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s conclusion that the District Court had erred
on the merits.18 The remaining four Justices answered no to both questions.19
Although the procedural issues are certainly interesting in their own
right, I want to explore several of the substantive implications of the
Court’s decision. The opinions give rise to two particularly interesting
questions—one doctrinal, the other more prudential and structural. Doctrinally, as Salazar is the first Establishment Clause case decided since Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s retirement, it offers the first actual glimpse into the
future of her pet “endorsement” test—and its future seems, to me, to be in
some doubt. Second, Justice Kennedy’s lengthy discussion of the secular
purposes behind the government’s efforts to preserve the cross memorial
raises—for me, at least—troubling questions about the Court’s increasing
desire to strip sacred symbols of their religious meaning and significance.
If this is in fact happening, I suggest it is evidence that we have lost sight of
one of the fundamental purposes of religious disestablishment—protecting
religion from the state’s destructive power. But I begin with the doctrinal
question.

13

Buono, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
Id. at 1182 n.8.
15
Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007). A request for rehearing was denied
after a slight modification to the 2007 opinion to highlight the importance of a fact-based analysis for
the endorsement test. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2007).
16
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct 1313 (2009) (mem.) (link).
17
Salazar, 130 S.Ct 1803, 1825–27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18
Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring; Alito, J., concurring).
19
Id. at 1842–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 1841 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/20/

33

105: 31 (2010)

Sacred Symbolism

I. THE FUTURE OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
The District Court, the Ninth Circuit, and three of the Supreme Court
dissenters evaluated Buono’s challenge within the doctrinal framework of
the so-called endorsement test, which asks whether a reasonable observer
would perceive that the state has “endorsed” religion.20 This test has
evolved over the last three decades (with Justice O’Connor’s careful nurturing) into the Court’s principal means of assessing whether a religious display on public land has the “primary effect” of advancing religion, per the
second prong of the Lemon test.21 O’Connor’s efforts to refine Lemon began in 1984 with her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case that challenged a Christmas display in a public park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.22
The majority upheld the display under the Lemon test, and O’Connor concurred in the judgment, writing separately “to suggest a clarification of our
Establishment Clause doctrine.”23 In her view, the establishment touchstone, at least in the context of religious displays, is whether the government’s actions amount to an endorsement of religion.24 Thus, she suggested
that Lemon’s first two prongs are best understood as an effort to determine
whether the government intends such an endorsement, and whether the
government activity in fact conveys such an endorsement.25 The third
prong, addressing the potential of an “excessive entanglement” between
church and state, is less relevant in the context of a religious display.26
Over the next few years, O’Connor’s endorsement test gained support
in the lower federal courts, and in 1989 she managed to get the support of a
majority of her colleagues, at least regarding the proper application of Lemon’s second prong.27 In Allegheny County v. ACLU , the Court again addressed several religious holiday displays on public property; this time, in
Pittsburgh.28 Using O’Connor’s approach, the majority evaluated the likelihood that a reasonable observer might perceive government endorsement
of religion and, based on the specific symbolism and context, invalidated a

20

Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d at 548–49; Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215–16; Salazar,
130 S.Ct 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21
Lemon famously formulated a three-part Establishment Clause test: “First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (link). For a thoughtful account of this doctrine’s evolution in various contexts, see Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion:
The Endorsement Test After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548761 (link).
22
465 U.S. 668 (1984) (link).
23
Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24
Id. at 690.
25
Id.
26
See id. at 689.
27
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S 573, 595–96 (1989) (link).
28
Id. at 587–88.
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crèche in the central stair of the city courthouse.29 At the same time, it allowed the display of a Christmas tree and a Menorah in a public park.30 But
just as notable as the majority’s acceptance of the endorsement test was Justice Kennedy’s impassioned dissent, in which he both decried O’Connor’s
framework as “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice,”31
and went to great lengths to demonstrate the “hostility” her test expresses
towards our national religious heritage.32
In truth, it is the “flawed in its fundamentals” criticism that lies at the
heart of Kennedy’s disagreement with O’Connor.33 At root, Kennedy—like
several prominent scholars34—views the Establishment Clause as complementing the Free Exercise Clause in protecting individual religious “duty”
from state intrusion; not, as the endorsement test seems to suggest, as the
guarantor of a “secular state.” The religious duty conception of disestablishment sees a First Amendment violation only when the government
forces citizens to choose between their obligations to the state and their obligations to God. To put it more bluntly, democratic government should not
require a choice between jail and eternal damnation.35 In this conception, an
established church is simply an especially virulent species of this tyranny.
The secular state view of disestablishment, which underlies the endorsement test, recalls the French doctrine of laicité: the state should remain totally neutral on religious questions and should do so by setting aside all
religion and religious reasoning in favor of secular rationales and policies.
Although the different approaches may seem a little like splitting theoretical hairs, the divergence of these first principles can, and sometimes
does, lead to dramatically different results in particular cases. Those who
support the duty conception often see efforts to ensure a secular state as
“hostile” towards religion, while secular state adherents worry that the
state’s imprimatur on particular religious symbolism or speech makes unrepresented groups feel excluded from their own government. The doctrinal
29

Id. at 598–602. The Court had already suggested that O’Connor’s test seemed to ask the right
questions just a year after Lynch, in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball , 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985)
(link).
30
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 618–20.
31
Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 655, 670–79.
33
The “unworkable in practice” criticism centers on the problem of assessing what a “reasonable
observer” might perceive. This inquiry, however, seems no more difficult than that into the “psychology” of coercion that Kennedy suggests. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593–94 (1992) (link).
34
See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause , 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
346, 351 (2002) (locating the “liberty of conscience” at the Establishment Clause’s theoretical heart)
(link); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular ” : Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision,
67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 958–59 (1989) (arguing that disestablishment originally required institutional separation rather than state secularism).
35
For an excellent exploration of this view, see MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY AND DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 65–67 (1996) (link); and accord Feldman, supra note
34, at 350–353.
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result of all this is, for Kennedy, that coercion against duty, not government
endorsement, represents the true establishment evil. For Kennedy, this
coercion might be direct or indirect—it may result from psychological
kinds of pressure, as well as the threat of force—but it has nothing to do
with endorsement, unless that endorsement rises to the level of coercion.36
Kennedy’s view of coercion was, for a time, the only one—and the only alternative to O’Connor’s endorsement test.37 Lee v. Weisman changed
all that, when Kennedy wrote for a majority that struck down a nonsectarian
benediction at a middle school graduation.38 Despite O’Connor’s protestations in concurrence, Kennedy did not employ the endorsement test, but rather concluded that the benediction presented “a particular risk of indirect
coercion.”39 This result drew a vigorous dissent from Scalia, who, along
with Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and Thomas, agreed that coercion is the relevant question, but rejected the “boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion” that
Kennedy described.40 Rather, for Scalia, the only kind of coercion that
gives rise to an establishment concern is direct—that accomplished by
“force of law and threat of penalty.”41 And so, after Lee, the Court had articulated three distinct establishment tests applicable in the religious speech
context: O’Connor’s endorsement test, Kennedy’s “indirect coercion” test,
and Scalia’s “direct coercion” test.
For the most part, O’Connor’s approach has maintained the support of
a tenuous majority since 1992,42 but, with her retirement in 2006, it was unclear whether the test would long survive. Indeed, Salazar was the first true
religious display case since her departure, and, as such, it presented an opportunity to assess the future of the endorsement test with a quick (and concededly crude) count of heads. Both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Sonia Sotomayor joined Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent, which express36

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660–62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Dolan characterizes the split in religious symbolism doctrine as one between “endorsement” and “history.” Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The
Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2010),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/21/LRColl2010n21Dolan.pdf (link). She is,
of course, correct to note these two positions in recent cases, but I would suggest that “history” arguments actually occur within the larger framework of the endorsement test: History advocates are simply
trying to show that the symbolism has a secular purpose, and thus is not an endorsement of religion. I
contend that—if they had the votes—Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia would toss out the endorsement framework altogether and focus instead on coercion. This, I think, is this ideological divide
that is really at stake after O’Connor’s departure.
38
505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992).
39
Id. at 592.
40
Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
41
Id. at 640 (emphasis in original).
42
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–92 (2005) (plurality) (evaluating whether a religious symbol has a purely “religious purpose”); id. at 699–701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (applying a form
of the endorsement test); id. at 715–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 737–43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same) (link).
37
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ly relied on the endorsement test and upheld the Ninth Circuit’s application
of the same.43 In Salazar , Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate dissent in
which he declined to reach the Establishment Clause question—arguing that
the Ninth Circuit’s unappealed 2004 decision settled the issue—and would
instead have upheld the 2005 order as a valid exercise of the District
Court’s discretionary enforcement of its own injunction.44 In the past, however, Breyer has largely stood behind O’Connor’s framework—though he
has, on occasion, given it his own spin.45 Therefore, I think it is safe to
count at least four votes in favor of the endorsement test. It is probably
equally safe, however, to count at least three votes—Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas—in staunch opposition, as the opinions in Salazar hardly suggest
that the “coercion” coalition has had any change of heart since Lee.
This leaves only the recent Bush appointees, Roberts and Alito, to consider. It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from Roberts’s
short (and, frankly, strange) concurrence in Salazar.46 The Chief Justice is a
passionate and adroit doctrinalist, however, and the fact that he was not
much concerned with the precise nature of the government’s effort to preserve the cross suggests that he may put little stock in the nuances of the
endorsement approach.47 Justice Alito’s concurrence provides a little more
insight into his views, but again, it is no smoking gun. The only direct clue
he offered is an enigmatic bit of speculation: “Assuming that it is appropriate to apply the so-called ‘endorsement test,’ this test would not be violated
by the land exchange.”48 This is hardly a statement of unconditional support, though the remainder of his opinion—which would have overturned
the District Court’s order without remand—indicates that he might be sympathetic to the kinds of concerns that underlie the endorsement analysis. He
gives significant weight to factual matters such as the monument’s original
purpose, the number of people likely to see it, and Congress’s intentions in
undertaking the land swap.49 All of this suggests that Alito may be willing
43

Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1832 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1842–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699–701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (link). In Van Orden, Justice Breyer accepts the fundamentals of the endorsement approach, but he opines that “no exact formula
can dictate a resolution in such fact-intensive cases.” Id. at 700. Instead, Breyer engages in an analysis
of the combined “religious” and “secular moral” messages that such longstanding monuments may express. Id. at 701. Indeed, Breyer’s approach here is very similar to that which Kennedy takes in Salazar.
46
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). I say the Chief Justice’s concurrence is
strange because he is prepared to decide the case based solely on the respondent’s questionable concession at oral argument suggesting that there would be no Establishment problem if the government took
the cross down, transferred the land, and the private party then put a new cross up. Not only is this a
dubious concession, but it also fails to address the primary endorsement issue in the case, which is the
extent of the government’s efforts to preserve the cross.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring).
49
Id. at 1821–23.
44
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to work within the endorsement framework. But he did vote to uphold the
cross display, which is suggests that, at the very least, his ideas about what
constitutes “endorsement” may be very different than O’Connor’s. Thus,
even if the endorsement test survives in name, it may end up being something closer to Kennedy’s indirect coercion test in application.
This last thought raises the question, though: what’s in a name? After
all, it might not matter whether we call the test “endorsement” or “indirect
coercion” if the analysis often produces the same outcome. But I think
there is a real and important distinction, which I hinted at above. The doctrinal test the Court adopts necessarily reflects its conception of exactly
what the Establishment Clause guarantees: Is it the promise of a “secular”
state, as a prohibition on government endorsement would suggest? Or does
it protect against a particularly problematic species of Free Exercise intrusion; the likelihood that an established church will cause the state to coerce
us against conscience? And over the last 30 years or so, the tension and
competition between these different, underlying principles has resulted in a
number of subtle doctrinal compromises that are potentially destructive of
our most fundamental disestablishment goals. Indeed, Salazar presents a
disquieting example of this phenomenon, as we see Kennedy—basically a
believer in the “duty” conception of disestablishment—try to squeeze the
Latin cross through the endorsement test by suggesting that it has lost its religious import and become a secular monument.50 This argumentative approach presents some very real theoretical problems, which the next Section
explores in a little more detail.
II. THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Salazar highlights a troubling
question about the state’s role in both assessing and shaping the public
meaning of religious symbols; one which emerges, I suggest, from the same
fundamental disagreement over the meaning of disestablishment. For Kennedy, given Salazar ’s procedural posture, the only issue before the Court
was whether the District Court “engage[d] in the appropriate inquiry” before enjoining the land exchange as an effort to evade its earlier judgment.51
Where the lower court went wrong, he wrote, was in its failing adequately
50

It may seem incongruous that Kennedy would operate within the endorsement test here, which he
has roundly rejected in the past. But, to be fair, Kennedy was essentially saddled with this approach
given S alazar ’s procedural history. He could only answer the narrow question of whether the District
Court had enforced its own injunction (which was based on an endorsement analysis) correctly. I suspect that if the substantive question were squarely presented, he might happily have applied the indirect
coercion test and avoided any discussion whatsoever of secular purpose or meaning. This circumstance
is one of the consequences of piecemeal adjudication that Professor Roy rightly laments in her contribution to this symposium. See Lisa Shaw Roy, S alazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication,
105
NW.
U.
L.
REV.
COLLOQUY
72
(2010),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/23/LRColl2010n23Roy.pdf (link).
51
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16.
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to consider the secular purpose behind the cross’s original placement, the
secular meaning it has come to have for many local people over the last 75
years, and the “dilemma” Congress faced in its efforts to cure the establishment violation without “conveying disrespect for those the cross was
seen as honoring.”52 Ultimately, Kennedy claims that the District Court did
not fully appreciate that this particular cross is a symbol “that has complex
meaning beyond the expression of religious views.”53 While all this may be
true, it fails to explain why—if the cross’s religious meaning is not central
to its symbolism—the easiest solution would not be to replace it with a nonreligious memorial. Despite Kennedy’s protestations about the monument’s
lengthy history, over which period “the cross and the cause it commemorated [became] entwined in the public consciousness,”54 it seems disingenuous (some might say sacrilegious) to deny that the symbol’s deep
religious significance adds something essential to the mix.
But maybe not. Maybe Kennedy is right when he claims that “a Latin
cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs [but] a symbol often
used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions and
patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and
its people.”55 But if that is true, if the cross has somehow lost much of its
most central and profound meaning by virtue of its association with the
state and its objectives, then I fear we have a real disestablishment problem
on our hands. Stanley Fish captured this growing concern in a recent New
York Ti mes editorial: “It is one of the ironies of the sequence of cases dealing with religious symbols on public land that those who argue for their
lawful presence must first deny them the significance that provokes the desire to put them there in the first place.”56 Indeed, in this particular oral argument a “visibly angry” Justice Scalia scolded Peter Eliasberg for
suggesting that the Latin cross is, in fact, a Christian symbol.57 It is this last
absurdity that highlights what is most disturbing about the current doctrinal
trend. In truth, it is hard to blame the advocates for their efforts to empty
symbols like the cross of their religious content; they simply tailor their arguments to the Court’s doctrinal landscape. And in recent years the Court
has been a willing co-conspirator, if not the instigator, in a troubling effort
to see the sacred as secular.58
52

Id. at 1817.
Id. at 1818.
54
Id. at 1817.
55
Id. at 1820. I cannot help noting that here Kennedy tellingly, though perhaps unintentionally, minimizes the importance of Christian beliefs with an ill-placed “merely.”
56
Stanley Fish, “When is a Cross a Cross?”, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 3, 2010),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross (link).
57
Liptak, supra note 1; accord Oral Arguments, supra note 4, at 39 (calling the thought that the
cross honors only Christian dead “an outrageous conclusion”).
58
See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005).
53
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This suggests two equally problematic possibilities: (1) the Court itself
is actively working to diminish the religious meanings of sacred symbolism; or (2) the Court is willing to accept and sanction the idea that long association with government can wash away a religious symbol’s central
significance. If either (or both) of these propositions is true, then I fear that
we have been poor stewards of the disestablishment promise. Most, if not
all, establishment scholars recognize that one of the clause’s central theoretical purposes is to protect religion from the corruptive power of the state.59
This strand of disestablishment theory, often called the “evangelical”
strand, has long been associated with Roger Williams’s efforts to wall off
the “garden” of the church from the “wilderness” of the state.60 And if
Kennedy is correct about the “secularizing” power an association with state
objectives can have on sacred symbols, then it seems that Williams’s garden is in real danger of being overrun. This is, in fact, the very danger that
Mark DeWolfe Howe warned of in his prescient book, now more than forty
years old, on the modern elevation of the “rationalistic” conception of disestablishment.61 Indeed, if all Kennedy says is true, Frank Buono need not
waste any more energy trying to get the cross off Sunrise Rock; the government has done it for him. Thus, however exciting Salazar may seem to
religious enthusiasts as a short-term win, one cannot help but suspect that,
in the long run, these same people may come to believe that victory came at
too steep a price.62
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Feldman, supra note 34 at 349–51; see Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 1: The Religious Liberty Guarantee , 80 HARV. L. REV.1381,
1386–90 (1967) (summarizing scholarly strands).
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See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965) (arguing for a renewed emphasis on the
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therefore if he will ever please to restore his garden and Paradi[s]e again, it must of necessit[y]
be walled in peculiarly unto himself[] from the world, and that all that shall be saved out of the
world are to be transplanted out of the Wilderness of the world . . . .
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For an interesting early perspective on this issue, see Rod Dreher, Commentary: The Cross Without Christ, BELIEFNET (May 5. 2010), http://blog.beliefnet.com/roddreher/2010/05/the-cross-withoutchrist.html (link).
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CONCLUSION
For a case that seemed destined to disappoint, Salazar v. Buono ended
up providing Establishment Clause observers with some surprising lateterm fireworks. Not only did the Justices, by and large, reach and comment
on the substantive constitutional question, but they did so in ways that highlight interesting and problematic questions about the Court’s past and future
treatment of religious symbolism on public land. On the one hand, the various opinions seem to suggest that the endorsement test, at least as we have
known it, faces an uncertain future. On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion implicitly bows to the secular purpose and meaning inquiries at that test’s heart, but argues that the District Court failed to give adequate consideration to the complex interests the cross on Sunrise Rock has
come to represent. It is no mystery why Kennedy and others feel compelled
to treat the cross and other religious symbols on public land as “predominantly secular”;63 they are reacting to a doctrinal culture they see dismantling valued pieces of our cultural heritage in its vigilance to insulate the
state from the threatening influence of religion. But this current tactic—the
effort to downplay religious meanings in order to minimize the threat—is
counterproductive; indeed, it seems far more hostile to religion than the endorsement doctrine to which Kennedy has so vehemently objected. Better,
one would think, to protest forthrightly the doctrine of the secular state than
to play along in ways that threaten to abandon the “other” disestablishment
goal: protecting the sanctity and vitality of the American religious garden
from the wilderness of the bureaucratic state.
But I am trying hard here not to take a side in this fight. I want to suggest only that Salazar sets the important doctrinal and structural issues in
bold relief, and asks very old questions in slightly new ways. In so doing, it
illustrates some interesting connections between divergent first principles
and our modern doctrinal battles—and highlights at least one potential
long-term consequence of the coercion coalition’s current argumentative
approach. While the opinions in Salazar do not provide any clear or definitive answers, they at least set the stage for a potentially new, post-O’Connor
era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. And it will be quite interesting
indeed to see what this era brings for American religious and political life.
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The phrase is from taken from Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van Orden. 545 U.S. at 702
(Breyer, J., concurring).
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